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COMMENT
WHAT’S MINE IS YOURS: TARGETING
PRIVACY ISSUES AND DETERMINING
THE BEST SOLUTIONS FOR
BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING
SARAH CATHRYN BRANDON1
I. INTRODUCTION
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1. J.D. Candidate, May 2013; B.A., The University of Texas at Austin. I would like to
thank my friends on the JCIL Staff for all their help and support. I would also like to thank
my brand new husband, Brian, for being so supportive of everything I’ve ever done and for
listening to me read this comment out loud so many times.
2. Daniel Indiviglio, Most Internet Users Willing to Pay for Privacy, ATLANTIC (Dec.
22, 2010, 4:04 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/12/most-internetusers-willing-to-pay-for-privacy/68443/.
3. Id.
4. Julie Brill, Competition and Consumer Protection: Strange Bedfellows or Best
Friends?, 10 ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 7 (2010).
5. Id.
6. Indiviglio, supra note 2.
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A recent Gallup poll suggests that two-thirds of Americans who use
the Internet would prefer to not have their browsing history stored and
then used for purposes of targeted, or behavioral, advertising.2 In fact,
most responded that they would be unwilling to give up the privacy that
is potentially compromised via data-storage in exchange for free content.3 However, people engage in products that are free on the Internet
all the time, Facebook and Google are probably the best examples.4 Arguably, Facebook would cease to exist if it did not store one’s personal
information in order to save one’s profile.5 However, the real issue for
people is not the purported purposes for which their information is being
obtained; rather it is that some advertising companies track browser history and retain consumers’ private information from those site visits
without consent.6
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A woman that announces her wedding engagement on Facebook can
certainly expect advertisements for engagement rings, photographers,
and dresses.7 Though she chose to announce her personal information, it
might not necessarily follow that Facebook should retain that information indefinitely for purposes aside from social networking.8 However,
there is usually not a traceable economic loss or physical injury that results from obtaining and storing personal data.9 This is evidenced by the
fact that courts have mostly rejected plaintiffs’ claims concerning privacy
issues resulting from the use of “cookies,” a tool used to store data on
computers.10
There are already laws against intercepting information via e-mail,
regular post mail, and telephone wiretapping without consent.11 However, new concerns arise in the context of behavioral advertising since
data storage can exists for decades and potentially store an infinite
amount of data.12 But is it merely a strange feeling associated with the
thought that one’s personal and private information is stored for potentially decades?13 Or is there an actual harm that stems from advertising
practices that retain seemingly innocuous information, such as browser
history or personal information that is essentially public record?14
At this point, it seems that privacy protection for purposes of behavioral advertising is at a standstill.15 What is the purpose of regulating
how long a company can store data if there is no harm to be recognized
by a court of law?16 One argument is that there is little privacy risk involved and consumers receive a benefit from targeted advertising; therefore, courts are unwilling to afford much relief to plaintiffs, as it would
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7. Catherine Schmierer, Better Late than Never: How the Online Advertising Industry’s Response to Proposed Privacy Legislation Eliminates the Need for Regulation, 17 RICH.
J.L. & TECH. 13, 1 (2011).
8. Id.
9. Bose v. Interclick, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 9183(DAB), 2011 WL 4343517, at *10 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 17, 2011). This assumes that the information is only used for behavioral advertising
and not so third parties could intercept the information, which will be shown later can
happen. See also Hirsch, supra note 9, at 446.
10. Bose, 2011 WL 4343517, at *28.
11. PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW 225 (1996).
12. James Schedwin, Behavioral Targeting: Issues Involving the Microsoft-Aquantive
and Google-DoubleClick Mergers, and the Current and Proposed Solutions to those Issues, 4
J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 704, 711 (2009).
13. Schmierer, supra note 7, at 1 (the issue is that this seems to go beyond the purposes of targeted advertising); see also Eric Goldman, Flash Cookies Lawsuit Tossed for
Lack of Harm—La Court v. Specific Media, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (May 4, 2011),
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2011/05/Flash_cookies_l.htm.
14. Eric C. Bosset, et al., Private Actions Challenging Online Data Collection Practices
Are Increasing: Assessing the Legal Landscape, 23 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L. J. 3, 4 (2011).
15. Id.
16. La Court v. Specific Media, Inc., 2011 WL 2473399, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2011).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. THE HARMS ASSOCIATED

WITH

BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING

A problem that plaintiffs are running into is whether the issues they
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17. Brief for Respondents at 9, Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) No.
10-779.
18. Schedwin, supra note 12, at 711.
19. Brian Stallworth, Future Imperfect: Googling for Principles in Online Behavioral
Advertising, 62 FED. COMM. L.J. 465, 473 (2010).
20. Slade Bond, Doctor Zuckerberg: Or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Behavioral Advertising, 20 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 129, 136 (2010).
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seem out of balance with the benefit conferred along with such slight
possible risk.17 However, plaintiffs still feel wronged and have not been
deterred from bringing suit.18 The reality is that there is more at risk
than is perceived.19 There are at least two potential harms that this comment argues should be recognized besides economic harms. The first is
the loss of personal dignity, and the second exists when unwanted third
parties intercept personal information.20
The Background section will begin with an overview of the issues
associated with behavioral advertising so far, which will segue into a
brief discussion of how cookies actually function in order to track
browser history. Following will be a summary of the case law and the
common law legal theories that plaintiffs have used in court that will be
further analyzed in the Analysis section. There will then be a brief introductory discussing the history of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC),
its authority, and how it has approached behavioral advertising. This
will be followed by Congress’ approach to privacy concerns in the behavioral advertising arena, including a specific discussion about the Electronic Communications Privacy Act and the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act, as well as the newly proposed “Do Not Track” Bill.
The Analysis section will include the argument that there are two
harms that should be acknowledged and protected. This comment seeks
to then rank each of the legal theories that plaintiffs have brought, and
which one will protect those potential harms the most. The most preferred way to protect consumers would be for the FTC to adopt its proposed “privacy by design” framework. This comment will also conclude,
however, that trespass to chattels claims should have some viability. A
slightly less preferred alternative is proposed, as well, which would
amend the current Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and the Electronics
Communication Act to include a cause of action for plaintiffs with no economic loss. The last alternative, not embraced at all, is for Congress to
enact new legislation that attempts to protect consumers.
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21. Stallworth, supra note 19, at 473.
22. Goldman, supra note 13.
23. See Hirsch, supra note 9, at 444.
24. Id. at 445.
25. Id. at 446.
26. Bosset, et al., supra note 14, at 4.
27. La Court, 2011 WL 2473399, at *7.
28. Id.
29. Interview by John Villfranco with David Vladeck, Director, FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection (Mar. 19, 2010); see http://www.kelleydrye.com/publications/articles/
1361/_res/id=Files/index=0/Villafranco_Interview%20with%20David%20Vladeck_Apiril
%202010.pdf.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Bond, supra note 20, at 136.
33. Id.

33953-sft_29-4 Sheet No. 66 Side B

bring before any court are viable or not.21 Some suggest that the privacy
risks involved in targeted advertising are minimal since no actual person
gets ahold of the information because it is tracked, stored, and used for
advertisements via cookies.22 Others have argued that this does not
close the door to third parties to intercept information, whether it is
criminals or even the government.23 The latter group argues that people’s most private inquiries are stored for an indefinite amount of time in
search engines, allowing people to link the searches back to a particular
user.24 The comprehensive user profiles that are created make it more
likely that a person is able to be identified, thus allowing the third party
that intercepted the information on the profile to commit fraud, identity
theft, or a host of other criminal activities.25 However, it is difficult for
protections to be in place when courts and scholars refuse to acknowledge the privacy implications of behavioral advertising.26
Moreover, courts have mostly required an economic or tangible
loss.27 This means that most of the cases have been dismissed simply
because the plaintiffs could not establish that they incurred a monetary
loss due to their personal information being tracked.28 This means that
privacy concerns are being defined monetarily, while personal choice and
the potential for information to fall into the wrong hands are being discounted as legitimate harms.29 The FTC’s previous methods for addressing the privacy concerns consumers had over behavioral advertising selfadmittedly did little to protect them because it focused on economic
harms, as well.30 This indicates the FTC’s willingness to embrace a
model that identifies more than monetary harms.31
There are at least two harms that should be recognized by courts
that this comment espouses.32 The first is personal autonomy and dignity, which reflects consumer choice and privacy.33 This is especially important with flash cookies because oftentimes the consumer has deleted
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browser cookies, indicating his desire to not be tracked.34 Flash cookies
eliminate consumer choice to not be tracked, as well as personal dignity
by tracking personal information anyway.35 The second harm, which has
already been mentioned, is the potential for unwanted third parties to
intercept information.36 This can happen by third party advertisers that
have used flash cookies to obtain personal information, hackers, or the
government without obtaining a warrant.37
B. HOW COOKIES WORK

C M
Y K

Schmierer, supra note 7, at 15.
Bond, supra note 20, at 136.
See Hirsch, supra note 9, at 444.
Id.
Schmierer, supra note 7, at 14.
See Hirsch, supra note 9, at 447.
Schmierer, supra note 7, at 12.
Schedwin, supra note 12, at 711.
Schmierer, supra note 7, at 14.
Bose, 2011 WL 4343517, at *3.
Schedwin, supra note 12, at 711.
Bond, supra note 20, at 133.
Schmierer, supra note 7, at 15.
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34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
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Targeted advertising is the process by which a company, via a
cookie, tracks a person’s browser history and collects personal information in order to direct specific advertisements better suited to that person’s tastes.38 The companies that engage in this are usually network
advertisers that enter into contracts with website owners, where the
websites track user data and allow the advertising network to then use
the data to direct specific advertisements back to the user on its own
website.39 This type of advertising cuts out the guess work for businesses
and allows them to deliver ads containing specific products similar to
what someone has searched for before or what they might be interested
in in the future based on the types of searches performed.40
A cookie is a file that is placed on the hardware of a consumer’s computer.41 They are used to store passwords and usernames for a site one
may visit.42 However, they are also able to track one’s web history across
multiple sites, store information from each of these, and combine it so
that companies can then direct ads suited to that person based on his
web activities.43 Cookies can store information for decades and end up in
massive databases that store private data.44 These databases are
profiles that are constructed in order to store the information on a particular consumer, and are used to redirect ads at the consumer based on the
information stored in the data base.45
There are two types of cookies used that allow a company to engage
in behavioral advertising.46 A “browser cookie” simply tracks browser
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history, and can be disabled and deleted by the consumer in the browser
settings on her computer so that her web history will no longer be
tracked.47 A “flash cookie,” on the other hand, is used to “respawn” a
browser cookie.48 The user has no notice that the flash cookie is being
engaged or that the browser cookie is reinstalled.49 Rather, once the user
has actively chosen to not have her information tracked by disabling the
browser cookies, her choice is effectively moot once a flash cookie re-enables the browser cookie.50
C. FTC, CONGRESS,

AND

COURTS’ APPROACHES

1. History of the FTC and its Approaches to Privacy
Consumer choice and protection was not at the forefront of the Federal Trade Commission’s mission when it was created in 1914 by the
Federal Trade Commission Act.51 Rather, it was primarily to ensure
businesses engaged in fair competition.52 The Federal Trade Commission Act was later amended in 1938 by adding Section 5, which gave
broad authority to the FTC.53 This amendment allowed the FTC to regulate all “unfair and deceptive acts or practices,” which then covered consumer protection, as well as businesses.54 The amendment also allowed
the FTC greater flexibility when approaching problems, which means
that it is theoretically able to look at consumers’ issues on a case-by-case
basis and address their specific concerns.55
The FTC does not have jurisdiction over all companies, though the
ones that are within its authority are subject to the frameworks and policies that it puts into place.56 The statutes granting enforcement authority to the FTC are: Federal Trade Commission Act, Children’s Online
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47. INDIANA UNIVERSITY INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SERVICES, http://kb.iu.edu/data/
ahic.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2011).
48. Schmierer, supra note 7, at 15.
49. Id.
50. La Court, 2011 WL 2473399, at *2.
51. Andrew Serwin, The Federal Trade Commission and Privacy: Defining Enforcement and Encouraging the Adoption of Best Practices, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 809, 814 (2011)
(noting the Act was passed concurrently with the nation’s first antitrust law, the Clayton
Act, reinforcing the FTC’s original purpose focusing on businesses).
52. About the Federal Trade Commission, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, (Nov. 13, 2011)
http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/about.shtm.
53. Id.
54. ANDREW B. SERWIN, ET AL., PRIVACY, SECURITY, AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT: AN
OVERVIEW 422 (2011).
55. Id. at 421.
56. About the Federal Trade Commission, supra note 52 (“Exempt from the FTC’s jurisdiction are many types of financial institutions, airlines, telecommunications carriers
and other types of entities.”); see DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY LAW
FUNDAMENTALS 102 (2011).
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57. SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 56, at 102.
58. S. 913, 112th Cong. §2 (2011). Most bills proposed by Congress would enforce
stricter regulations through the FTC. See Hirsch, supra note 9, at 452.
59. Serwin, supra note 51, at 815.
60. Schmierer, supra note 7, at 41.
61. Serwin, supra note 51, at 815
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Stallworth, supra note 19, at 491.
65. Serwin, supra note 51, at 815 (quoting “substantial” from FTC v. Accusearch Inc.,
570 F.3d 1193, 1190-1206 (10th Cir. 2009) (describing when a website sold various personal
data, including telephone records, the FTC brought suit against the website, Accusearch,
Inc., and its president and owner to stop the sale of confidential information and to require
it to disgorge its profits from any sales that had already taken place). “Substantial” in this
case constituted the emotional harm associated with stalking or harassment and the costs
associated with changing telephone providers. Id.

33953-sft_29-4 Sheet No. 68 Side A

Privacy Protection Act, Gramm-Leach-Billey Act, Telemarketing and
Consumer Fraud Abuse Prevention Act, and the Fair Crediting Reporting Act.57 The recent “Do Not Track” Act proposed by Senator Rockefeller to give consumers better means of opting out of being tracked
includes a provision stating that enforcement will be accomplished via
the FTC.58
In 2000, the FTC adopted a “notice-and-choice” model to approach
consumer privacy, which charged companies with developing privacy notices that would better inform the consumer of their practices so the consumers could make an informed decision.59 This became problematic
because although the consumer had the ability to read the policies, the
agreements still did not provide much consumer control.60 Furthermore,
the policies still became more complex over time, burdening consumers
with having to read lengthy policies they had little control over to begin
with.61
Wanting to adopt a policy that better reflected consumer concerns,
the FTC then promoted the “harm-based model,” which focused more
specifically on the harms that the consumer actually encountered.62
However, this approach did little to remedy the issues with the previous
approach and came with its own problems.63 Within this framework, the
FTC focused less on what was actually agreed to in the privacy policy
and instead on the actual injury the consumer suffered later on due to
either a breach or because of an unfair policy.64 This had two effects: (i)
it still did not allow consumer control or mandate clearer privacy policies; and (ii) it required the consumer to show a “substantial” harm, often
an economic one.65
Finally, and more recently, the FTC has looked at a “privacy by design” framework, which recognized more readily that there are other
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harms besides economic ones.66 However, these types of harms, such as
personal dignity and the possibility of third parties intercepting private
information have not yet been acknowledged by most courts.67 Courts
still seem hesitant to recognize that someone can be harmed simply because his browser history is tracked and information from that history is
stored.68 The privacy by design framework would take a more regulatory approach by asking companies to fulfill certain measures such as
retaining data for a certain purpose and only for as long as necessary to
fulfill that purpose.69 It also seems the most apt to accomplish what Professor Daniel Solove from George Washington University Law School has
advocated, which is a method that “prevent[s] harms from arising rather
than merely providing remedies when harms occur.”70
With behavioral advertising, the FTC has noted the benefit that consumers themselves receive from targeted advertisements, apart from the
one that companies get by directing ads to a specific group of people that
are more likely to be receptive to those products.71 The FTC therefore
designed an approach to consumer privacy that would allow consumers
and companies to still engage in this symbiotic relationship while providing a framework for consumers to feel protected.72 This approach favors
“self-regulation” that focuses on ensuring consumers receive adequate
notice that they are being tracked and allows for them to consent by continuing to browse the web or disabling the cookies themselves.73 This
will allow companies to utilize policies that provide protection without
“stifling innovation where privacy concerns are minimal.”74
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66. James P. Nehf, The FTC’s Proposed Framework for Privacy Protection Online: A
Move Toward Substantive Controls of Just More Notice and Choice?, 37 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1727, 1732 (2011).
67. Bose, 2011 WL 4343517, at *28.
68. Id.
69. Nehf, supra note 66, at 1732.
70. Serwin, supra note 51, at n. 14 (citing Daniel J. Solove, Identity Theft, Privacy, and
the Architecture of Vulnerability, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1227, 1242 (2003)).
71. Schmierer, supra note 7, at 33.
72. Brill, supra note 4, at 7-9.
73. Schmierer, supra note 7, at 58.
74. Interview by John Villfranco, supra note 29.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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The FTC’s approach has shifted slightly as technology has developed, citing newer developments in privacy issues.75 In a 2010 interview
with FTC Director David Vladeck, he noted that the harm-based
frameworks “do not promise to serve us well in the future.”76 He added
that the FTC should focus more on principles that “guide us as we move
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forward,” attributing this to how quickly technology develops.77 It should
be noted that the FTC has also repeatedly called for Congress to consider
some type of “do not track” legislation.78
2. Legislation v. Market Regulation
Proponents of government regulation argue that legislation can set
specific rules and guidelines that, with the force of law, would force companies to put privacy ahead of profits.79 This usually means that Congress enacts legislation that is enforced by the FTC.80 Some bills would
require privacy policies to be clear, “provide users with meaningful
choices,” and require actual consent before the website could start tracking one’s information.81 Online marketing firm, Ad Age Digital, laid out
three reasons for why it advocated do-not-track legislation (though not
specifically the “Do Not Track” Act of 2011).82 They were as follows:
First and foremost, it is the right thing for consumers. Many consumers
just do not like being tracked. We should respect this, and let them opt
out. Second, done right, legislation will incentivize innovation, as well
as the adoption of best practices. Third and far from least, a good law,
by making consumers feel safe, will help big brands feel comfortable
spending online.83

Opponents argue that Congress does not understand privacy better
than the market, and that legislation, besides being slow to enact, has
difficulties keeping up with technological changes.84 Privacy law and
targeted advertising are unique because newer privacy concerns arise
out of newer devices and technologies.85 What were once privacy con-
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77. Id. (these comments also reflect the FTC’s stance on “formal regulations on privacy,” which are not embraced because of rapid technological innovation).
78. FTC Testifies on Efforts to Protect Consumer Privacy, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
(May 9, 2012), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2012/05/donottrack.shtm. The FTC has also considered implementing a “do not track” mechanism, similar to the “do not call” registry that
would allow consumers to opt out of being tracked, without requiring the government to
maintain a list of participants. This proposal, to date, has not been decided on yet. Oddly, it
would most likely require the use of a persistent cookie to function. This comment does not
discuss the “do not track” mechanism, but does note that it is probably at odds with the
privacy by design approach embraced here. See FTC Resources for Reporters, The Do Not
Track Option: Giving Consumers a Choice, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (Aug. 28, 2012)
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/reporter/privacy/donottrack.shtml.
79. See Hirsch, supra note 9, at 452.
80. Id.
81. See Hirsch, supra note 9, at 453.
82. Steven Vine, Meet the Big Online Marketing Firm That Wants ‘Do-Not-Track’ Legislation, AD AGE DIGITAL (Aug. 12, 2010), http://adage.com/article/digitalnext/meet-big-online-marketing-firm-track-legislation/145346/.
83. Id.
84. See Hirsch, supra note 9, at 453.
85. Stallworth, supra note 19, at 469.
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86. S. 913.
87. Brill, supra note 4, at 48.
88. Interview by John Villfranco, supra note 29.
89. Id.
90. Schedwin, supra note 12, at 711.
91. Nehf, supra note 66, at 1729.
92. Id.
93. Schmierer, supra note 7, at 50. The bills mentioned in this article are the BoucherStearns Privacy Discussion Draft and the Best Practices Act, introduced by Representative
Bobby Rush. Id. The prior had more accountability mechanisms built in which, the article
notes, “dovetail[ed] the industry’s efforts to increase the accountability in online behavioral
advertising through new compliance programs.” Id.
94. See Hirsch, supra note 9, at 453.
95. Cecelia Kang, Sen. Rockefeller Introduces “Do Not Track” Bill for Internet, POST
TECH (May 9, 2011, 4:23 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-tech/post/senrockefeller-introduces-do-not-track-bill-for-internet/2011/05/09/AF0ymjaG_blog.html.
96. S. 913.
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cerns over desktops and laptops is now extended to hand-held devices.86
Moreover, market regulation proponents argue that companies are better able to address more quickly privacy concerns because they understand their product best and can incorporate solutions into the
competition.87 Furthermore, they are better able to more efficiently accommodate when technologies become obsolete or evolve into newer
products with different technology.88 FTC Director David Vladeck has
noted that: “[The FTC is] spending a lot of [its] time now thinking about
mobile applications because the reality is, within five years, mobile
smart phones, iPads, and PDAs are going to dominate the marketplace,
and laptops may be an anachronism.”89
The middle ground to this is self-regulation, which the FTC has
mostly embraced.90 This, exponents argue, allows for a more rapid adjustment to newer technologies since companies know their policies and
businesses better than anyone else.91 This is accomplished while simultaneously establishing a privacy framework that ensures consumers are
adequately protected.92
Recently, Congress has felt the need to do more in the behavioral
advertising arena, and several members of Congress have put forth their
versions of bills that would afford protection.93 Most of the bills have
focused on regulating the actual collection and use of data.94 A recent
bill, dubbed the “Do Not Track” Bill, was proposed by Senator Rockefeller out of concern that “companies have too much freedom to collect user
data on the Internet,” and is unique because it includes a provision that
extends protection to mobile devices.95 This type of regulatory approach
seems to codify what the FTC has tried to propose in the past, focusing
on clear and concise notices, but adds an “opt-out” feature that enables
the consumer to still visit a website without being tracked.96 The FTC
has asked Congress before to enact legislation that would accomplish
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these goals, but in the meantime requires companies to adhere to
whatever self-regulations they have imposed on themselves within the
context of the goals the FTC has set forth.97
Congress has enacted laws before that have afforded privacy protection to consumers.98 The two that this comment focuses on are the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) and the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act (ECPA). Both were enacted long before the electronic version
of targeted advertising was even thought to exist.99 Though both have
been effective in providing relief in certain circumstances, they have so
far proven inapplicable to claims where plaintiffs complain that their
personal information was tracked and stored.100
The CFAA, enacted in 1986, was specifically intended to combat
criminal computer hacking by prohibiting and punishing unauthorized
access to computers.101 It also has a civil remedy, which states that “any
person who suffers damage or loss by reason of a violation of this section
may maintain a civil action against the violator to obtain compensatory
damages or injunctive relief or other equitable relief.”102 However, the
relevant way in which a plaintiff can establish “loss” under the CFAA in
behavioral advertising cases is subject to a $5,000 threshold.103 The
plaintiffs bringing suit against advertisers have seriously struggled to
meet this requirement and have had difficulties showing there was nonconsent when they agreed to privacy agreements.104
The ECPA includes the Wiretap Act, the Stored Communications
Act, and the Penn Register Act.105 The ECPA’s original purpose was to
provide equitable relief to people whose electronic communications were
“intercepted, disclosed, or used” during transmission of the communica-
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97. Serwin, supra note 51, at 815. The FTC, it its most recent Report, again called
upon Congress to consider legislation. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE, 26 (2012) available at http://ftc.gov/os/2012/03/
120326privacyreport.pdf.
98. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e) (1984); Electronics Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1986).
99. Id.
100. See In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litigation, 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 519 (S.D.N.Y
2001); see also Bose, 2011 WL 4343517, at *10 (dismissing plaintiffs’ claims under either
theory for failure to meet minimum damages requirement of failing to show non-consent in
both cases).
101. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e).
102. Id.
103. Bose, 2011 WL 4343517, at *7.
104. Id. The other type of damages that could be shown are: “potential modification or
impairment of a medical diagnosis, examination, treatment, or care of one or more persons,
physical injury, a threat to public health or safety, or damage to a government computer
that is used in furtherance of the administration of justice, national defense, or national
security.” See SERWIN, supra note 54, at 61.
105. SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 56, at 36.
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tion from one party to another.106 Most plaintiffs have brought claims
under the Wiretap Act specifically, which extended privacy protection to
information on telephone lines.107 These claims have been dismissed, as
well, though there is no $5,000 threshold for them to meet.108 The problem that plaintiffs face is similar to ones with the CFAA, in that a privacy agreement is usually used as evidence of consent.109 There is also
an issue as to whether information that was obtained from cookies,
rather than “during transmission,” would violate the Act.110 Under one
of the ECPA exceptions, consent by a “party to the communication” exempts either the user or the Internet Service Provider (ISP) from being
liable for third party interceptions.111
3. Issues Courts have with Plaintiffs’ Claims
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106. Bosset, et al., supra note 14, at 4.
107. HARRY HENDERSON, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 66 (Infobase Publishing rev.
ed. 2006).
108. See generally Electronics Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1986).
109. HENDERSON, supra note 107, at 66.
110. Id.
111. In re Doubleclick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 519. (emphasis added); see also HENDERSON,
supra note 107, at 66 (noting other exceptions to the ECPA, including the “business use
exception, which permits interceptions in the ordinary course of business, and the service
provider exception,” which states that certain acts are “incidental to rendering service”).
112. See Hirsch, supra note 9, at 444.
113. HENDERSON, supra note 107, at 66.
114. La Court, 2011 WL 2473399, at *3.
115. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217 (1977).
116. eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1154-55 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
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While there are debates about whether or not government regulation or self-regulation should guide overall consumer protection, there
still seems to be an issue as to whether there really are legitimate privacy concerns over one’s browser history, which may or may not contain
personal information.112 Courts have dismissed plaintiffs’ claims regarding their personal information being tracked regardless of any legal theory they bring litigation under.113
Two of the common law legal theories plaintiffs have sought relief
under are trespass to chattels and unjust enrichment.114 The elements
needed to prove a traditional trespass to chattels claim in tort law are:
(1) that one dispossesses the other of the chattel; (2) the chattel is impaired as to its condition, quality, or value; (3) the possessor is deprived
of the use of the chattel for a substantial time; and (4) bodily harm is
caused to the possessor, or harm is caused to some person or thing in
which the possessor has a legally protected interest.115 In eBay, Inc. v.
Bidder’s Edge, Inc., the traditional trespass to chattels claim was extended to cases involving computers.116 In these cases, a plaintiff can
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establish that a defendant trespassed if: (1) he intentionally and without
authorization interfered with the plaintiff’s possessory interest in a computer system, and (2) the defendant’s unauthorized use proximately resulted in damage to the plaintiff.117 However, courts have held plaintiffs
to a high standard, often having to prove an actual economic or tangible
harm.118 This has been a problem with plaintiffs because of the difficulty
assessing a monetary value to one’s personal information, and the right
to one’s enjoyment of their property has been limited to a showing of
actual damage to the computer’s functionality.119
The other common law legal theory plaintiffs have tried to use, unjust enrichment, requires that: (1) the defendant was enriched; (2) at the
plaintiff’s expense; and (3) this benefit conferred upon the defendant was
unjust.120 These claims have also failed because plaintiffs have not been
able to prove that their personal information conferred a benefit upon
advertising companies in a way that is unjust to them.121 These courts,
as well as the FTC, have noted that this benefit is not unjust because
consumers, besides receiving a benefit from targeted advertising, are
also receiving a service from the websites they visit, and often at no
cost.122
4. Summary of Cases to be Analyzed
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117. Id. The elements are revised to reflect the unique circumstances of computer invasion, yet seem to require similar showing of damages as a tradition trespass to chattels
claim would require. Id.
118. HENDERSON, supra note 107, at 66. A more tangible harm would include a showing
of actual damage to one’s computer. See Bose, 2011 WL 4343517, at *7.
119. La Court, 2011 WL 2473399, at *8.
120. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 (2011).
121. Bose, 2011 WL 4343517, at *25.
122. Interview by John Villfranco, supra note 29 (noting that most people would prefer
to have advertisements directed toward them). At the same time, they receiving a service
from their ISP or from the website they are visiting. Id.
123. Bose, 2011 WL 4343517, at *1. The plaintiff brought suit under several legal theories, including the CFAA, New York state law claims, and state common law claims.
124. Id. at *3.
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This comment points out three specific cases that will demonstrate
the issues plaintiffs have had in bringing suits regarding their private
information being tracked. In Bose v. Interclick, plaintiff Bose brought
suit against Interclick, an advertising network company, claiming that
Interclick used flash cookies to back up deleted browser cookies.123 The
plaintiffs alleged that they deleted the browser cookies that were deposited on their hard drive by the defendant to prevent their browsing history from being tracked and stored.124 However, after deleting the
cookies, the defendant respawned the browser cookie via the flash cookie
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without consent.125 The defendant moved for a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or cognizable injury under the CFAA.126 The court
granted all of the defendant’s motions to dismiss except for the New York
General Business Law § 349 claim and the trespass to chattels claim,
and only because they were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss in
that they “adequately pled a claim.”127 This meant the case could go on
to trial because there were enough facts to possibly prove the claim.128
In La Court v. Specific Media, the plaintiffs were consolidated into
one action, claiming that they set the security control on their computers
to “block third-party cookies and/or periodically delete third-party cookies,” yet each had the cookies respawned by a “flash cookie” by the defendant, an online third-party network.129 These flash cookies, plaintiffs
contended, were installed without their “notice of consent.”130 They
sought relief under the CFAA, trespass to chattels, unjust enrichment,
California’s Invasion of Privacy Act, Computer Crime Law, Consumer
Legal Remedies Act, and Unfair Competition state laws.131 The court
first noted that the California Invasion of Privacy Act claim that the
plaintiffs raised was “arguably preempt[ed] by ECPA,” that unjust enrichment cannot serve as an independent claim, and that the plaintiffs
failed to allege any impairment at all to their computers with respect to
the tort claim.132 The motion to dismiss was granted on all claims.133
Lastly, in In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litigation, the plaintiffs
also argued that the defendant advertising company violated the CFAA
and ECPA by depositing cookies onto their hard drives without authorization when plaintiffs accessed websites that were affiliated with the advertisers.134 After a lengthy interpretation of both statutes to determine
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125. Id.
126. Id. at *1.
127. Id.
128. Id. at *22. Plaintiff failed to allege any facts regarding these claims against most
of the defendants. Id. Defendant Interclick’s motion was denied, however, and plaintiff was
allowed to at least continue on with the pleading. Id. It is yet to be determined the outcome
of this though. Id. The plaintiffs’ New York state law claim maintained that the defendants
practice constituted a “deceptive business act” by misleading customers into thinking that
their information was private when it actually allowed customers’ information to be
tracked. Id. at *18. The court determined that the plaintiffs pled enough facts to at least
survive a motion to dismiss, and that a privacy violation could constitute injury for purposes of Section 349. Id. at *19.
129. La Court, 2011 WL 2473399, at *2.
130. Id.
131. Id. at *8.
132. Id. at *7, *8 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2011) (noting that because unjust enrichment cannot serve as an independent claim, it cannot serve as independent cause of action; there
was further detailed analysis concerning the unjust enrichment claim in this specific case).
133. Id. at *9 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2011).
134. In re Doubleclick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 503.
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the applicability of the statutes to these types of suits, the court granted
the defendants’ motion to dismiss.135 The court concluded that the defendants fell into the ECPA exceptions, that the plaintiffs would be subject to the CFAA $5,000 minimum damages requirement (though they
did not meet it), and that ECPA did not extend to the use of cookies here
because DoubleClick received authorization “with respect to a communication of or intended for that user.”136
This comment will argue that courts and regulatory bodies are out of
sync with one another, if not just for the fact that one is trying to protect
consumers while the other is denying that any “harm” exists.137 Courts
reject common law approaches to issues that arise under targeted advertising, as well as legal theories that attempt to state a claim under other
statutes with a specific cause of action.138 Meanwhile, Congress has
tried to approach privacy issues as though they are inherent in targeted
advertising, while the FTC, not willing to decry behavioral advertising
altogether, instead adopts an approach that embraces the benefits of it
while affording protection to consumers.139
III. ANALYSIS
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135. Id. at 527.
136. Id. at 519.
137. Bosset, et al., supra note 14, at 3.
138. Id. at 4.
139. Brief for Respondents, supra note 17, at 9.
140. La Court, 2011 WL 2473399, at *3.
141. Id.
142. Interview by John Villfranco, supra note 29. Thus, previous FTC policies are consistent with how courts have addressed plaintiffs’ claims in that they consistently deny
that any relief is available unless there was an economic injury, which itself denied since
either nominal interference with the computers or because one cannot assign a monetary
figure to their personal information. See In re Doubleclick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 525 and La
Court, 2011 WL 2473399, at *9.
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So what is it exactly that the FTC and Congress are trying to protect? If it is just about giving people a choice, courts have dismissed cases
where people exercised their choice, only to have it overridden by
respawning cookies.140 But to the plaintiffs that have demanded redress,
it is not innocuous at all that their information is being tracked and
stored.141
In an April 2010 interview with the Director of the FTC Bureau of
Consumer Protection, the interviewer noted that the director had previously suggested that “tangible harm-based models” might not be adequately addressing other types of harms that are not economically able
to be redressed, such as a “consumer’s dignity.”142 This suggests that
there actually are other harms other than tangible ones, and therefore
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other types of relief may be required to protect such harms.143 Furthermore, there is more than one solution that will provide consumer protection.144 This section will analyze each solution and propose whether it
should be adopted as the best way to protect consumers from potential
harms, including ones not yet recognized by many courts.
A. HARMS

THAT

SHOULD

BE

RECOGNIZED

C M
Y K

10/02/2013 12:46:52

143. Bosset, et al., supra note 14, at 4.
144. See generally Bosset, et al., supra note 14.
145. See Hirsch, supra note 9, at 444.
146. Bosset, et al., supra note 14, at 3.
147. Interview by John Villfranco, supra note 29.
148. Id.; see also Schmierer, supra note 7, at 42; see also Brill, supra note 4, at 8. These
harms would be adequately protected with the proposals this comment puts forth. See generally Interview by John Villfranco, supra note 29.
149. Bond, supra note 20, at 137.
150. Bose, 2011 WL 4343517, at *3.
151. Id.
152. Interview by John Villfranco, supra note 29.
153. Serwin, supra note 51, at 815
154. Brill, supra note 4, at 43.
155. Bosset, et al., supra note 14, at 3.
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Consumer harms have proven difficult to define.145 It is hard to argue for protection when courts have dismissed plaintiff’s claims, stating
that they suffered no tangible harm.146 Moreover, these harms must be
weighed against the purported advantage of behavioral advertising, as
well as what proposed solutions could do to prevent them.147 However,
this comment suggests that there are at least two harms that should be
acknowledged and afforded relief.148
The first is consumer dignity and personal autonomy.149 This is violated when personal choice is overridden by flash cookies that respawn
deleted browser cookies.150 Once the browser cookies have been removed, the consumer has expressed her decision to not be tracked or
have targeted advertising directed toward her, regardless of any benefit
she may receive from it.151 This has been supported by the FTC, recognizing that notice and choice models can be unclear and the harms-based
model has only applied to consumers that have “suffered an economic
harm.”152 Though both of these models have proved to be somewhat unreliable, they do indicate that the FTC does appreciate the importance of
a consumer being able to understand privacy policies and having the
ability to choose whether to accept them.153 There needs to be teeth to
this though by having a model that adequately protects, not just acknowledges, this right.154 This could lead to courts also taking this right
seriously.155

33953-sft_29-4 Sheet No. 73 Side A

10/02/2013 12:46:52

\\jciprod01\productn\S\SFT\29-4\SFT404.txt

2012]

unknown

Seq: 17

WHAT’S MINE IS YOURS

1-OCT-13

14:39

653

The second harm that should be recognized has two elements that
need to be acknowledged. The first requires acceptance that people provide much more than their public record type information on the Internet.156 The second is that information is not just bounced back and
forth in a digital realm, but can fall into the hands of unwanted, and
unwarranted, third parties.157 Some users search for information that
could be highly embarrassing or sensitive information, including
searches related to sexual, medical, religious, and political inquiries.158
Some sites ask for social security numbers.159 There is an argument that
even public record information is sensitive because if it is intercepted by
an actual person rather than remaining in some digital logarithm, this
could potentially identify the user along with his private searches.160
Moreover, this should be balanced with one’s right to “free speech and
association,” and one should not be forced to refrain from making online
inquiries out of fear of being tracked.161
The ability for one to relate every private detail of his life becomes a
real harm when it falls into the hands of a third party.162 This could lead
to “identity theft, credit card fraud, cyber-stalking, [and] damaged
credit.”163 The government also has been able to receive personal information about consumers from internet service providers (ISPs) without
obtaining a warrant first.164 Rather, government officials are able to
subpoena a user’s search history, as though it were a document owned by
the ISP with no regard to the personal information in it.165 This is significant because the Wiretap Act set up requirements for a search warrant
in order for the government to intercept telephone communications.166
However, this has not been extended to situations in which the communications, or personal information, is transmitted via an Internet
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156. Stallworth, supra note 19, at 473.
157. See Hirsch, supra note 9, at 444.
158. Schedwin, supra note 12, at 712.
159. See Hirsch, supra note 9, at 446.
160. Id.
161. Schmierer, supra note 7, at 11.
162. See Hirsch, supra note 9, at 446 (citing an investigation done by journalists that
were able to find out what a particular user’s name was by piecing together her searches
after claims my major search engines that they do not link users’ searches with their identities). That is, though these companies may not themselves link them, it was proven easy
to do by a third party regardless. Id.
163. Stallworth, supra note 19, at 473.
164. Schedwin, supra note 12, at 711.
165. Hirsch, supra note 9, at 446. Note that a paradox is created by those who propose
government involvement in regulation while admitting government itself creates privacy
issues. Id.
166. HENDERSON, supra note 107, at 66.
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search.167
Thus far, while non-economic harms have been somewhat acknowledged in the academy, no successful policy or framework has adequately
addressed these, and courts certainly have not recognized them as any
type of harm.168 However, once these harms are recognized, progress can
be made toward actual privacy protection.169 That said, a distinguishing
point about these harms must be mentioned. The first harm regarding
personal choice reflects a situation in which the consumer has expressly
deleted browser cookies yet they were respawned; here, the type of information stored should be irrelevant to a court’s inquiry into the plaintiff’s
harm.170 However, the second harm can either be premised on wrongful
interception by third parties or on the type of sensitive materials that
were obtained.171
B. COMMON LAW THEORIES
1. Trespass to Chattels
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167. Tristram R. Fall, III, Current Developments in Privacy and Security- Impact of
Technology, 82 PA. B.A.Q. 139, 145 (2011).
168. Bosset, et al., supra note 14, at 3.
169. Brill, supra note 4, at 43.
170. Goldman, supra note 13.
171. Stallworth, supra note 19, at 478. This is to say that demographic information that
is obtained could be rendered harmless and the focus of the harm would be on the wrongful
interception. Id.
172. eBay, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1154-55.
173. Bose, 2011 WL 4343517, at *23.
174. Goldman, supra note 13.
175. La Court, 2011 WL 2473399, at *2.
176. Bose, 2011 WL 4343517, at *23.
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Traditional trespass to chattels claims have been extended to provide relief for a plaintiff whose computer was trespassed upon i.e. hacked
without authorization.172 This is significant because, while it is certainly
a step toward allowing one to recover when there has been no physical
trespass, like on to one’s land, it could also represent a way for plaintiffs
to recover when their personal information is stored even for targeted
advertising purposes.173 However, some courts have seemed unwilling to
extend this legal theory to claims where one’s public record type information has been stored.174
That said, in keeping with the tradition of the trespass to chattels
claims, there is also something to be said about plaintiffs who are so concerned about their personal information being tracked that they must
continuously delete browser cookies.175 This certainly interferes with
one’s ability to enjoy his property for a “substantial amount of time.”176
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177. Id.
178. See Hirsch, supra note 9, at 445.
179. La Court, 2011 WL 2473399, at *2.
180. Id. at *8.
181. Bosset, et al., supra note 14, at 4. The statutes that require a tangible or economic
injury that courts have regularly seen are the Electronic Communications Privacy Act and
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. Id.
182. Bose, 2011 WL 4343517, at *23. The court notes that “unsolicited emails ‘deplete
hard disk space, drain processing power, and adversely affect other systems resources.” Id.
at *23, *24. However, plaintiff failed to allege any such harm or that she was deprived of
the enjoyment of her computer due to any of these factors. Id. at *24.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Bosset, et al., supra note 14, at 4.
186. Id.
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Furthermore, one’s concern over his history should not be questioned.177
This would be unfair for the plaintiff to prove the seriousness of his concern, as his fears are already actualized by the possibility of third parties
intercepting his search histories without consent.178
In La Court v. Specific Media, the court determined that the plaintiffs did not allege any actual harm or malfunction of their computers
after Specific Media installed flash cookies on the plaintiffs’ computers in
order to track their browser history for the purpose of behavioral advertising.179 The court rejected the claim that being unable to delete cookies
impaired the computer, and made it clear that there must be an actual
intention or threat to impair to a “degree that would enable them to
plead the elements of the tort.”180
Other courts have determined that this degree of harm must be tangible or economic, as is required under some statutory causes of action.181 The court in Bose v. Interclick determined that there would need
to be some hard proof that the functionality of the plaintiff’s computer
had been affected i.e. that she was deprived of her enjoyment of her property, as is required from a traditional trespass to chattels claim.182 The
court noted that though the plaintiff failed to allege facts regarding the
tort claim for most of the defendants, it did not grant the motion to dismiss, claiming that there was at least an adequate pleading of the
claim.183 This indicates that the court in Bose was at least willing to
hear out issues regarding one’s personal information being stored.184
The main problem plaintiffs have is that one cannot assess an economic value to his personal information.185 Therefore, claiming an economic injury because a company has obtained such information is
difficult when the courts require a similar injury as is required under the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act statutory claims.186 This is unfortunate for plaintiffs because it
effectively eliminates their ability to state a claim under multiple legal
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theories, even if the statutes and common law claims have different elements.187 The court in Bose v. Interclick at least entertained the idea
that there are ways in which harm could be shown, but that the plaintiff
in that case did not allege such facts.188 Though this still would require a
tangible harm, it is not as high of a standard.189 This should be expanded to show harm against personal dignity when plaintiffs expressed
that they did not want their browser history tracked, yet companies did
so against consumer wishes.190
The unfortunate aspect of courts denying trespass to chattels claims
is that it denies the privacy implications of a company ignoring a consumer’s wishes by respawning undesired cookies on his computer.191
This is a good legal theory for plaintiffs who are arguing that their personal dignity and right to choice were harmed.192 Plaintiffs should also
allege that they are deprived of the enjoyment of their computer when
they are constantly deleting browser cookies to ensure that they are not
being traced every minute they are on the web.193 Though it may seem
nominal, it may be a step in the right direction for courts to hear plaintiffs out that their choices are being taken away.194
Lastly, one may argue that a consumer should avoid certain websites if she does not want to be tracked. However, most consumers are
not aware that flash cookies exist.195 This legal theory best addresses a
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187. Id. This is especially unfair since in modern trespass to chattels cases, a plaintiff
does not need to show that there was actual damage to the chattel, rather, that they were
merely deprived of their enjoyment of it. See § 217. Thus, the real hurdle plaintiffs should
have is whether they were deprived of the use, or enjoyment, of their computer. Id. They
should at least be able to argue that point, rather than have their claims melded together
so that if they cannot prove one, they automatically cannot prove another without the court
seriously looking at each element of each claim. Id.
188. Bose, 2011 WL 4343517, at *22.
189. Id.
190. Bond, supra note 20, at 138 (citing Ruth Gavinson, Privacy and the Limits of Law,
89 YALE L.J. 421, 425 n.9 (1980)) (describing a framework in which privacy is “described as
the control of personal information and physical access”). Personal autonomy is related to
choice over the access of one’s personal information located in one’s browser history. Id.
191. Interview by John Villfranco, supra note 29. This is a corollary of the first harm
this comment espouses that should be recognized. Id. The actual information stored should
not necessarily be a consideration by the court simply because demographic information is
deemed harmless. Id. One problem the trespass to chattels claim could face is that it does
not adequately address the second harm this comment suggests should be recognized because an actual harm must occur before relief is available. § 217. However, once these
claims are brought to court, the potential threat of information ending up in the wrong
hands will be acknowledged, and the trespass to chattels claim could become more viable in
other contexts, as well. See Stallworth, supra note 19, at 473.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Bose, 2011 WL 4343517, at *25.
195. Schmierer, supra note 7, at 14-15.
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situation where a plaintiff actively chose to not be tracked, and was unaware that she was being tracked anyway by respawned browser
cookies.196
2. Unjust enrichment

C M
Y K

10/02/2013 12:46:52

196. Interview by John Villfranco, supra note 29.
197. Bose, 2011 WL 4343517, at *25. Arguably, in the context of targeted advertising,
when a consumer’s choice is effectively taken away, their privacy is invaded. Bond, supra
note 20, at 142. A customer should not be expected to see which advertisers every single
website hires to track information and deposit cookies on a hard drive, as they cannot be
expected to stop visiting all sites that might engage in such advertising practices. Id. Once
they actively choose to opt out of a tracking situation, their privacy is invaded once that
unauthorized user respawns cookies for the purpose of tracking their information. See
Nehf, supra note 66, at 1728 (questioning “should [data collection] be limited if it undermines. . .personal autonomy, or should we just accept that our lives are increasingly an
open book?”).
198. La Court, 2011 WL 2473399, at *9.
199. Id.
200. Bose, 2011 WL 4343517, at *25.
201. Bosset, et al., supra note 14, at 4; see also La Court, 2011 WL 2473399, at *9.
202. § 39.
203. Brill, supra note 4, at 7.
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Plaintiffs have also tried obtaining relief via quasi-contract theory,
arguing that because plaintiffs in good faith gave their personal information to websites, they should in return receive goods and services offered
by those websites.197 California courts have held that unjust enrichment, or quasi-contract theory, cannot be an “independent claim;” thus it
does not have an independent cause of action.198 That is, quasi-contract
is a theory or principle that underlies other forms of relief, but is not
itself a remedy, and therefore nothing is recoverable solely under the
theory of unjust enrichment.199 Because there is either no cause of action
that can be afforded and plaintiffs have failed to allege that they did not
receive any service from the defendant after providing personal information, unjust enrichment claims have been dismissed.200
This is one common law claim that courts have rightly dismissed, if
not for the simple fact it is not an independent cause of action.201 Although a benefit is certainly conferred upon a defendant, the second and
third elements still must be proven – that it was at the expense of the
plaintiff and that it would be unjust to retain this information.202 Arguably, websites use people’s personal information specifically to benefit
those whom they obtain the information from, and simply because they
are being benefited by it as well, it is not automatically unjust.203 It
must truly be unfair for the defendant to retain the information, which is
hard to argue since, as the FTC recognizes, people who use the Internet
themselves receive a benefit from their information being stored for pur-
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poses of behavioral advertising.204 Ultimately, although consumers in
these types of cases conferred a benefit upon a defendant, they themselves also received a benefit, such as free e-mail service.205
It is important to point out that although unjust enrichment claims
should presumably fail because the plaintiff is receiving a benefit from
the defendant, this should not diminish a trespass to chattels claim for
two reasons.206 First, the elements of each claim are different.207 Even
though it may seem unfair for a plaintiff to recover since he received a
benefit from a free Internet service, trespass to chattels does not require
that one receive such benefit.208 The trespass to chattels claims should
turn on whether a plaintiff deleted browser cookies, continued service
with a website, and then ultimately was tracked via flash cookies.209
However, if one continues to go to a website and enjoy its services, unjust
enrichment should fail, even if just for a technical inability to satisfy one
element.210
Second, there is an argument that the plaintiffs are receiving a benefit not just from a website’s or company’s service, but from targeted advertising, as well.211 With a trespass to chattels claim, the plaintiff
would not have to argue that he did not enjoy the benefit conferred upon

206. Interview by John Villfranco, supra note 29.
207. See § 217 and § 39.
208. § 217.

210. § 39.
211. Indiviglio, supra note 2.
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209. La Court, 2011 WL 2473399, at *3. Showing that service was continued would not
be an element of the claim, but would be useful in showing that a plaintiff was being
tracked after deleting cookies on their computer and continued service with an ISP or a
website thinking that they were not being tracked. Id.
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204. Id.
205. In re Doubleclick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 525. The problem with plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claims is they are receiving a benefit via the services, which are often free, from
the companies obtaining their information. Interview by John Villfranco, supra note 29.
That is, it just does not satisfy all of the elements of an unjust enrichment claim. § 39. The
reason why it should not be an issue in the trespass to chattels claim is that, as this article
suggests, the tort law should be extended to cover plaintiffs that have expressly opposed
companies tracking their information and storing it. Bosset, et al., supra note 14, at 4. The
elements of trespass to chattels do not require a showing of a benefit conferred or that the
plaintiffs did not in turn receive a benefit or compensation. § 217. So, even though the
unjust enrichment claims cut against the fact that it should not be important for a plaintiff
to establish an economic value on their personal information, that is only because the elements of the restitution claims are just not met and cannot be reasonably manipulated or
extended to cover plaintiffs. § 39. A logical extension of existing trespass to chattels elements is reasonable here though because it does not require a showing that plaintiff received a benefit from defendant, it merely requires proof that defendant accessed one’s
computer without authorization. § 217.
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him by a website which tracked his information.212 Rather, one should
only have to show that he or she opted out of the tracking process, yet
was tracked anyway through a company’s use of flash cookies.213
C. STATUTORY CAUSES

OF

ACTION

1. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act

C M
Y K

10/02/2013 12:46:52

212. § 217. A result otherwise would be unfair to the plaintiffs, especially have having
opted out of being tracked. La Court, 2011 WL 2473399, at *3.
213. La Court, 2011 WL 2473399, at *3. Again, this is not to include another element to
the tort. Id. Rather, this would help establish that the plaintiff did opt out of being tracked.
Id.
214. Bosset, et al., supra note 14, at 4.
215. In re Doubleclick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 525.
216. Bosset, et al., supra note 14, at 4.
217. Schmierer, supra note 7, at 15.
218. Id.
219. Bosset, et al., supra note 14, at 4.
220. In re Doubleclick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 520.
221. Schmierer, supra note 7, at 42.
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Even though the original purpose of the CFAA was directed at computer hacking, there is a logical extension of the statute for plaintiffs
that have attempted to disable the cookies placed on their computer.214
For example, the CFAA’s criminal section sets forth that “whoever intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized
access, and thereby obtains information from any protected computer . . .
shall be punished.”215 Though this is the criminal language of the statute, it can easily be applied to the civil section since its purpose should be
the same: to deter defendants from accessing another’s computer without
authorization.216 That element is clearly met when a plaintiff can prove
that she purposely removed cookies from her computer so her personal
information would not be obtained and stored, yet websites continued to
respawn cookies in direct opposition to what the plaintiff desired.217 The
only hurdle at this point would be damages.218
Under CFAA present causes of action, plaintiffs simply are not
meeting the $5,000 threshold in order to obtain relief.219 This problem
stems from the fact that it is very difficult for plaintiffs to either show
that the functionality of their computer was affected very much by the
respawning of browser cookies, or that they are unable to assess an economic value to their personal information.220 However, if privacy concerns really do exist surrounding targeted advertising and the retention
of personal information, there must be a way for plaintiffs to obtain relief
when they have made a choice to not have their information stored.221
Assuming these concerns are valid, it is simply too much to ask a plain-
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tiff to meet that $5,000 threshold in these specific cases.222 Furthermore,
the defendants in In re DoubleClick admitted that they did not have authorization to access the plaintiffs’ computers and conceded that the
plaintiffs were protected under CFAA.223 The only argument the defendants raised was that plaintiffs simply failed to meet the $5,000 threshold.224 This seems to imply that, had the plaintiffs met the amount
required, they would have had a solid case.225 A defendant can admit
that it did not have authorization to access a consumer’s browser history,
yet it is currently acceptable because there is not a purely economic loss
to the plaintiffs.226
Courts have also not been sympathetic to plaintiffs that have signed
or accepted privacy agreements, which means that plaintiffs have accepted the terms, and thus, consented to other parties obtaining and
storing their personal information.227 However, this should be weakened
in cases where a plaintiff’s intent is established by showing that he removed cookies from his hard drive specifically so his information would
not be retained.228 Courts should be open to allowing a factual determination as to whether the plaintiffs in these situations actually signed
privacy agreements and then removed the cookies, or if they removed the
cookies first when there was no actual agreement between the parties, or
whether the agreement itself is even valid.229 This would help establish
what the plaintiffs’ intentions were in protecting their personal information, and if their wishes were simply ignored.230
2. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act
Plaintiffs have also brought suit under Title I, the Wiretap Act, of

10/02/2013 12:46:52
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222. In re Doubleclick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 520.
223. Id. It is unfortunate also that such a high amount of damages has to be met in
order for plaintiffs to obtain relief, even though defendants could be held liable for the exact
same conduct that merely resulted in more economic loss. Id. This is an extreme burden on
plaintiffs, especially given that courts are not allowing plaintiffs to aggregate their claims.
Id. at 523. There seems to be a paradox at this point with the law and what plaintiffs’
injuries are: simply because plaintiffs cannot access an economic value to their demographic information, courts will not hold defendants liable even when they admit they accessed a computer without permission. Id. at 520. This is especially significant in the
context of flash cookies because, in those cases, plaintiffs have expressly opted out of having their information stored and there is direct evidence that defendants obtained the information anyway. La Court, 2011 WL 2473399, at *3.
224. In re Doubleclick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 520.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Nehf, supra note 66, at 1729.
228. La Court, 2011 WL 2473399, at *3.
229. Nehf, supra note 66, at 1732.
230. La Court, 2011 WL 2473399, at *3.
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231. Bosset, et al., supra note 14, at 4.
232. Id.
233. In re Doubleclick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 519 (emphasis added). Though maybe a superficial reading, it is worth noting that “person” could be construed very narrowly and not
apply to businesses or digital interceptions where a person technically has no contact with
the communication. Id.
234. Stallworth, supra note 19, at 473.
235. Id.
236. Bosset, et al., supra note 14, at 4.
237. Interview by John Villfranco, supra note 29.
238. Anne Keaty, et al., Can Internet Service Providers and Other Secondary Parties Be
Held Liable for Deceptive Online Advertising?, 58 BUS. LAW. 479, 495 (2002).
239. Schmierer, supra note 7, at 15.
240. Bosset, et al., supra note 14, at 3.
241. ASHKAN SOLDTANI ET. AL, FLASH COOKIES AND PRIVACY 1, 2 (2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1446862.
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the Electronic Communications Privacy Act.231 They assert that their
ISP allowed advertisers to intercept user data to build large profiles that
would be used to direct advertisements back to the users.232 The problem is that most plaintiffs have been unable to establish that advertisement companies did not have authorization or were not exempt from the
statute. However, the problem with the Act is in the language of the statute itself: “It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not
acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior
consent to such interception. . .”233 Thus, the users do not have to consent in order for a third party to gain access, which seems fair when
transparent and fair privacy policies are in place.234 But, what if the
policies are not so clear? This has been an issue the FTC has been trying
to approach for years, and has gone through several frameworks to adequately address it.235 There should at least be a consideration as to the
quality of the policy before dismissing plaintiffs’ claims under the
ECPA.236
Furthermore, at least one of the two harms previously identified by
this comment would not be adequately protected by the current ECPA,
the harm to one’s personal dignity.237 Consumers should be presented
with clear policy disclosures in order to make an informed decision
whether they should proceed or not with a certain ISP.238 This is very
important in the context of flash cookies, where consumers often do not
realize that cookies have respawned on their computer.239 Plaintiffs
have also rightly argued that flash cookies are not controlled by browsers, and thus flash cookies are not subject to browser privacy policies.240
Further, the use of flash cookies is usually not even mentioned in privacy
settings.241 This means that although consumers have agreed to privacy
disclosures, they are not being fully informed of the potential for their
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information to be tracked, even after they delete browser cookies.242
Again, the type of information, innocuous or not, should not really be
an issue for this type of harm.243 Consumers’ privacy concerns should
not be delegitimized by companies that claim they only use demographic
information for a benefit to the consumer, who may not want the benefit
to begin with.244
Furthermore, Congress is already considering adding a cause of action under the ECPA expressly for companies that obtain someone’s personal information without consent.245 This could be significant because
the way courts are interpreting the statute now, it does not matter which
party authorized the interception, especially if there was a privacy policy
in place.246 Thus, at this point, ECPA claims are being denied while Congress is considering amending it, while at the same time dismissing state
law claims because the ECPA preempts it.247 This is paradoxical because
there is an indicator that Congress sees legitimate privacy concerns, yet
the court in La Court v. Specific Media dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint, concluding that the “[state] statute’s application to the conduct
alleged . . . [was] far from obvious.”248
3. Statutory Section Conclusion

C M
Y K
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242. Schmierer, supra note 7, at 15.
243. Bose, 2011 WL 4343517, at *3.
244. Interview by John Villfranco, supra note 29.
245. Bosset, et al., supra note 14, at 4.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. La Court, 2011 WL 2473399, at *8. Applying the state or federal statute would
presumably produce the same non-result for plaintiffs in that case. Id.
249. Bosset, et al., supra note 14, at 4.
250. Id.
251. In re Doubleclick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 520.
252. Bosset, et al., supra note 14, a 4.
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Some courts have argued that these federal acts preempt similar
state laws.249 This means that plaintiffs will find it difficult to be afforded relief via their state’s laws, effectively eliminating another route
to recovery.250 It is very likely that the first step may be to include
causes of action under these statutes since several courts are requiring
plaintiffs to allege a “tangible” injury in common law theories similar to
what is already required under these statutes.251 Once these statutes
allow a cause of action that provides relief for plaintiffs whose personal
information has been stored for targeted advertising uses, perhaps
courts will then allow plaintiffs common law relief as well, since they can
show an actual injury.252 However, it seems counter-productive for a
plaintiff to have to wait for one avenue of recovery to open up in order to
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obtain access to another.253
However, because legislation can be slow to achieve, it might, either
out of necessity or out of chronology, be that courts recognize the FTC
efforts to acknowledge other types of harms besides economic ones.254
This might be the faster solution; however, CFAA and ECPA should at
least be adjusted to include a cause of action for plaintiffs who have expressly chosen to have cookies deleted off their hard drive, only to have
them recreated via flash cookies.255 In In re DoubleClick, the plaintiffs
simply could not establish that the use of cookies caused them any
harm.256 Either way, there is an issue when companies act under the
guise of consumer choice, allowing consumers to think they are making a
choice by deleting cookies, only to have that choice irrelevant by persistent flash cookies.257
D. LEGISLATIVE

AND

FTC

EFFORTS

1. FTC
The FTC has for the most part consistently relied on self-regulation
approaches for businesses, which requires that they create their own regulatory policies for obtaining and storing a customer’s browser history
and personal information and then merely adhere to those policies.258
The FTC however has set out a framework for which companies should
use when making their self-regulations.259 These goals consist of greater
user control and transparency of user agreements, which would include
making agreements clearer and easier to read, and allowing express consent by the consumer to allow the company to specifically use his data for
behavioral advertising.260 These goals promote consumer dignity be-

10/02/2013 12:46:52
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253. Id.
254. Charles W. Johnson, How Our Laws Are Made, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/holam.
txt (last visited Nov. 13, 2011). There are several ways in which a bill may originate: by a
member in the Senate (unless it is a bill raising revenue), the House, a constituent or the
President can propose one. Id. They can be discussed and debate by committees and subcommittees, and both the House and the Senate have different procedures for voting on a
bill. Id. This process includes many discussions, conferences, proposals for amendments,
and several readings of the bill. Id. Ultimately, both must pass the bill before it goes to the
President for approval. Id. Note that all of the differences the House and the Senate had
about the bill must be reconciled and a unified version presented to the President. Id. Even
then, the President may veto it and send it back to Congress along with his reasons for
rejecting it. Id.
255. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g).
256. In re Doubleclick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 525.
257. Id.
258. Nehf, supra note 66, at 1730.
259. Id.
260. Id. This is itself another problem. Id. Studies suggest that people do not read the
disclosures because they are lengthy or contain legalease that is difficult to wade through.
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Id. Behavioral studies show that people make inferences about information they may be
missing, which could lead to agreeing to a disclosure they might not have normally accepted. Id. Moreover, if information presented, though difficult to read, seems innocuous,
people tend to assume there will be innocuous consequences resulting from accepting a
privacy agreement. Id. There is an argument to be made that notice and choice models are
not the best way to protect people because it is not a “substantive control.” See Nehf, supra
note 66, at 1740.
261. Brill, supra note 4, at 9.
262. Schedwin, supra note 12, at 724.
263. Id. at 711.
264. 263. Brill, supra note 4, at 9.
265. Schedwin, supra note 12, at 724. This does not include criminal interceptions;
rather it refers to business mergers and third party advertisers. Id.
266. Schmierer, supra note 7, at 58.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
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cause it allows the consumers to understand what they are reading and
have the ability to make their own informed decisions whether to proceed or not.261
The FTC also encourages companies to only store information for as
long as necessary to “fulfill legitimate business needs,” ensure that the
data collected is reasonable for those needs, and to adhere to the policies
they set forth to the consumer even if they change the policies later.262
The latter point is to help contribute to the transparency and ensuring
consumers understand that the initial policy they agree to will be the one
committed to.263 This helps avoid information falling into the hands of
unwanted third parties because information stored will be used for specific purposes and will not be retained indefinitely, which contributes to
the privacy risks.264 Also, privacy policies cannot be altered once entered
into, so there cannot be deliberate sharing of information with a third
party.265 One may argue that these policies the FTC has set forth are not
binding on any company, and if a company so chooses not to adopt these,
the goals are with no effect without the force of law.266
That said, regulation still might not be necessary as the mere threat
of adopting full on regulation would cause companies to take self-regulation more seriously and take the initiative to adopt those policies.267
This is supported by situations in which the FTC has threatened litigation, and companies then choose self-regulation that comports with those
policies set forth by the FTC.268 These arguments suggest that legislation by Congress is unnecessary because the FTC has adopted an approach that is flexible with changing technology and has a corollary
effect where companies comply simply out of fear that the FTC or Congress will take more regulatory approaches or from the threat of being
sued.269
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By still abiding by a self-regulatory framework and the goals it promotes, the FTC has shifted in its approach concerning behavioral advertising from a notice and choice model to the privacy by design
approach.270 This still asks companies to design policies that they promise to abide by, yet acknowledges that other harms exist besides economic harms.271 This is very significant in that it reflects courts’
unwillingness to provide relief to plaintiffs that do not establish tangible
or economic harms, yet is willing to make the first step in doing just
that.272
Because it is very difficult for the law to adapt and anticipate
changes in technology, this FTC framework is important because it recognizes that one must try to adapt with developing technology that keeps
traditional notions of privacy at the forefront.273 This is a good framework because it balances the FTC’s goals without over-regulating the
market.274 Because this newer framework allows companies to consider
what type of privacy protections they would like to offer at the forefront
of creating their disclosure policies, it allows protections to consumer privacy to be a component of the competition amongst the markets.275 This
is also important because it could achieve a desired method that does not
simply redress a plaintiff’s claims, but prevents harms, of all types, from
occurring at the outset of privacy agreements.276 Further, privacy by design inherently requires that companies continuously confront privacy
issues at every stage of development of their products.277
However, despite the fact that the FTC continues to promote the privacy by design framework and that companies are starting to abide by
them, the FTC continues to call on Congress to enact legislation.278 How-

10/02/2013 12:46:52

C M
Y K

33953-sft_29-4 Sheet No. 79 Side A

270. Id. at 43.
271. Id.
272. In re Doubleclick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 525. This is not to insinuate that courts are
waiting on the FTC to take action or that they base judgments on whether the FTC recognizes what is a harm; rather, this is to show further that if the FTC can recognize certain
harms besides economic ones, eventually this could lead to statutes with causes of action
then eventually successful common law claims that allow plaintiffs a remedy. Id.
273. Serwin, supra note 51, at 815.
274. Brill, supra note 4, at 9.
275. Id. The other side to this is that businesses in the forefront of the market could
eventually dominate and essentially develop a model framework themselves, which in turn
would be anti-competitive. Id. However, legislation and regulation can be very slow to wait
on, and since the law and technology is a unique field that is changing quickly, solutions
that allow flexibility should be favored over hard and fast rules set in stone that do not
allow change with development of newer technology. Interview by John Villfranco, supra
note 29.
276. Serwin, supra note 51, at n. 14 (citing Solove, supra note 70, at 1242).
277. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 97, at vii.
278. Id. “The Commission now also calls on Congress to consider enacting baseline privacy legislation and reiterates its call for data security and data broker legislation. The
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ever, legislation would destroy the flexibility the framework allows by
taking it out of the free-market context, which is better adept at finding
innovative ways to adopt ever-changing technology that the companies
understand better than Congress.279 By not over-regulating, and by encouraging companies to use the privacy by design approach, it allows
room for technological innovation.280 Too much regulation could make it
very difficult for plaintiffs to try their claims based on advanced technology that legislation or FTC regulation was unable to keep up with.281
The law can be a tool for change, but it takes a long time to enact, and
often struggles to keep up with future, or even current, issues in the
technological arena.282 Thus, while new businesses may have an advantage in being able to design their privacy models in a way that is quicker
than forcing older businesses to update theirs, competition hopefully
would create an incentive for the older businesses to keep up.283 Furthermore, companies tend to change their privacy policies enough where
the FTC has made it one of the goals of company self-regulation to abide
by the disclosures they promise to uphold when consumers read the policies.284 Arguably, a company going back to change its policy cuts against
this FTC goal, but it also, and more importantly, requires companies to
reconsider their disclosures in light of a new framework that is correctly
adopted by the FTC.285
The current FTC privacy by design framework allows companies to
still engage in self-regulation, and also achieves the goals of keeping information for as long as business purposes require and only retaining
information specific to those purposes, all while encouraging competition
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Commission is prepared to work with Congress and other stakeholders to craft such legislation. At the same time, the Commission urges industry to accelerate the pace of selfregulation.” Id. at viii.
279. Schmierer, supra note 7, at 75.
280. Id.
281. PHILLIP E. AGRE & MARC ROTENBERG, TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE 213 (1998).
282. Id. The authors claim that privacy laws have been a success when their goals were
narrowly tailored, but that another problem with privacy laws is that their “target keeps
changing” and that the target is “too broad.” Id. Though these are legitimate problems, it
will always be easier to list off the problems and find ways the law has been effective in
different ways for each of those problems independently. Id. However, the goal is to find a
solution to all of the problems listed. Id. The authors note that a “rational and broadly
applicable set of privacy principles may be beyond reach of the law of any single state or
nationality.” Id. This lack of satisfaction, one that asks for broad application but not a
broad target, among most privacy laws begs the questions whether legislation is appropriate in the area of behavioral advertising. Id.
283. Brill, supra note 4, at 10.
284. Schedwin, supra note 12, at 724.
285. Id.
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in the market for privacy protection.286 It does this by allowing privacy
policies to be adaptable for each company’s interest and encouraging
them to consider privacy issues earlier than the “notice and choice” models, which only serve to inform the consumer that his browser history
will be tracked and the information stored.287 This will also allow recognition that there could be other forms of harm besides one that an economic value can be assigned to.288 Ultimately, this seems to remedy the
two effects of the notice and choice and harms-based frameworks by asking for more transparency from the beginning while also allowing flexibility (as technology develops) and recognizing harm in the dignity of
consumer choice.289
This is the preferred solution this comment adopts because it works
with the free market and encourages adaptations to common law
claims.290 However, there is yet another way that plaintiffs could see
relief, and that is via newly enacted legislation.
2. “Do Not Track” Bill
While part B of this comment suggests that an amendment to CFAA
could be the beginning of plaintiffs seeing relief when they are subjected
to targeted advertising, it was not without a warning. The fact that Congress is already considering statutory reform that would include a cause
of action similar to what was proposed earlier in this comment demonstrates that it is difficult for legislation to adequately protect consumers
in the technological market.291 David Vladeck has said that “we are addressing technologies that are evolving so quickly that it would be . . .
foolhardy to try to set rules in place knowing that two or three years
later they would be rendered obsolete.”292
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286. Bond, supra note 20, at 142. Too much privacy may actually be counterproductive
and stifle the ability of advertisers to deliver the benefit to consumers who choose to participate in targeted advertising. Id.
287. Serwin, supra note 51, at 815.
288. Schmierer, supra note 7, at 42.
289. Id. at 79.
290. Id. The idea is that because courts, proposed legislation, and the FTC are out of
sync with one another, it will require somebody to make the first move in actually recognizing other types of harms consumers could experience besides tangible ones. Id. If the FTC
recognizes these types of injuries, such as harm to dignity or personal autonomy, hopefully
courts will extend the trespass to chattels claims to cover these injuries as well (eliminating choice means less protection of personal information, and thus, trespass). Bond, supra
note 20, at 142. This will also, hopefully, eliminate the need to amend existing legislation
or enact a new online privacy bill. Bosset, et al., supra note 14, at 4.
291. Bosset, et al., supra note 14, at 4.
292. Interview by John Villfranco, supra note 29. Though David Vladeck was answering for the FTC, this clearly applies to legislative efforts, as well, that would be relying on
the FTC to enforce its regulations. Id.
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S. 913.
Bosset, et al., supra note 14, at 4.
Interview by John Villfranco, supra note 29.
Id.
See Hirsch, supra note 9, at 452.
Schmierer, supra note 7, at 43; see also Vine, supra note 82.
Bosset, et al., supra note 14, at 4.
Vine, supra note 82.
Schmierer, supra note 7, at 76.
Serwin, supra note 51, at 842.
Id.
Id.
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Even recently proposed bills, such as the “Do Not Track” Act of 2011,
attempts to address new privacy concerns over mobile devices.293
Though arguably it is good that this bill includes a provision that prohibits unauthorized collection of personal information via mobile devices, it
is still subject to the criticism that even it will fall behind the times.294
FTC Director David Vladeck has suggested that mobile phones could
supplant laptops, and this can only hold true for such hand held devices,
as well.295 The point is that it will always be difficult to anticipate newer
technologies no matter how advanced we think we are.296
Proponents of government regulation claim that the best way to protect consumer privacy is by establishing specific rules that limit businesses’ ability to collect, store, and distribute one’s information.297
However, this is exactly what the FTC hopes to promulgate through the
privacy by design framework, which encourages companies to establish
clear policies earlier rather than later, after the harm is already done.298
The FTC framework also encourages innovation by not binding them to
inexorable rules that do not allow protection for future technology.299
Simply saying that “we . . . should let [consumers] opt out” does not automatically mean that legislation is the best tool to accomplish that goal,
as this comment has set forth in previous sections.300 Because the FTC
has already put forth a guideline for companies to follow, legislation
would arguably only be “[maintaining] the status quo,” but without the
flexibility of the FTC framework.301
Furthermore, the FTC has in the past asked Congress to pass legislation that would further require businesses to comply with the notice
and choice model the FTC had previously adopted. However, Congress
declined to do so and the FTC began encouraging other means to promote the notice and choice model, one being self-regulation.302 This indicates that Congress is somewhat unreliable when it comes to regulation
anyway, but that the FTC is still able to establish its own framework
without a statutory force of law.303 This also reflects the FTC’s ability to
adapt as it sees fit due to changes in technology or because of
frameworks that prove unable to adequately protect consumers.304
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In the FTC’s most recent report containing recommendations to
businesses and policymakers concerning privacy, it again called for legislative action.305 Congress may be listening this time, as several proposals for do-not-track legislation have emerged, yet their efforts may be at
a standstill at this time.306 Meanwhile, the FTC still embraced privacy
by design and called upon companies to develop ways to embrace the
goals it set forth in the report.307 It seems that not only is Congress unreliable, but also its actions unnecessary, as companies such as Mozilla,
Microsoft, and Apple have already developed the “latest versions of their
browsers [that] permit consumers to instruct websites not to track their
activities across websites.”308 Several privacy advocates claim, however,
that self-regulation is not enough, and has fallen short so far.309 However, the fact that some companies are already taking steps to protect
privacy does not mean that every single company has to. Rather, businesses that show concerns for privacy may be setting the bar for market
competitiveness for privacy protection. Legislation could impede market
innovativeness, setting minimal standards that force every company to
adopt, creating no incentive for better privacy protection.310 Further,
having specific, yet not necessarily required, goals set forth by the privacy by design approach, rather than express mandates or strict guidelines, allows companies to experiment with the best way to achieve those
goals.311 The FTC should continue to “call on companies” to promote privacy initiatives, thus putting the burden on them to want to protect consumer privacy.312
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305. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 97, at vii.
306. Juliana Gruenwald, Ad Industry, Privacy Advocates Spar Over ‘Do Not Track’, NATIONAL JOURNAL (September 21, 2012), http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/ad-industryprivacy-advocates-spar-over-do-not-track—20120921.
307. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 97, at vii.
308. Id. The FTC recently stated that its “final report highlights initiatives undertaken
by a number of companies to respond to the Commission’s call for Do Not Track: Microsoft,
Mozilla, Apple, Google, the online advertising industry through the Digital Advertising Alliance, and the World Wide Web Consortium, an international standard-setting body, have
all taken significant steps forward.” See FTC Testifies on Efforts to Protect Consumer Privacy, supra note 78.
309. Id.
310. Kevin J. O’Brien, Privacy Advocates and Advertisers at Odds Over Web Tracking,
NY TIMES (Oct. 4, 2012) http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/05/technology/privacy-advocatesand-advertisers-at-odds-over-webtracking.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. Dan Jaffe, the executive vice president of the Association of National Advertisers, went further to say “if
these various proposals limit this type of advertising, it will cut down on the amount of free
information that consumers have on the Internet, create incentives for online companies to
erect pay walls, and lead to more shotgun forms of advertising.” Id.
311. Schmierer, supra note 7, at 76.
312. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 97, at vii.
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Ultimately, while anticipating these innovations can be somewhat
done, as is shown by the FTC privacy by design framework, there is
something to be said about the sluggishness of legislation.313 It could
create gaps between those who simply the bill could not get to fast
enough to protect and those it does, only in time for a new shift in technology to occur.314 Legislation that would use the FTC to enforce the bill
would cut squarely against the FTC’s ability to call upon companies to
adopt different approaches more quickly and efficiently than Congress
would be able to.315 Congressional regulation should be avoided altogether if consumer choice really matters since the FTC is in a better position to adapt quickly to technology changes that affect consumer
privacy.316
As this comment has explained, there are several ways in which a
consumer could be protected.317 However, some ways are more effective
than others, yet the best solution is one that contains realistic goals
when attempting to protect consumer privacy when technology develops
very quickly.318 It should be flexible, like the FTC privacy by design
framework, with policies that anticipate innovation and reflect all the
possibilities of different types of harms.319 Once these are adequately
protected, they would inherently be recognized as true harms, hopefully
prompting courts to recognize them as such, as well.320
IV. CONCLUSION

Johnson, supra note 254.
Id.
S. 913.
Schmierer, supra note 7, at 76.
See generally Bosset, et al., supra note 14.
Interview by John Villfranco, supra note 29.
Schedwin, supra note 12, at 729.
Bosset, et al., supra note 14, at 3.
Stallworth, supra note 19, at 470.
Id.
Bosset, et al., supra note 14, at 3.
Id. at 4.

10/02/2013 12:46:52

313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

33953-sft_29-4 Sheet No. 81 Side B

Targeted advertising affects nearly every person who performs
searches on the Internet, has a Facebook profile, or a Gmail account.321
Browser cookies are used to track these inquiries that contain personal
information such as social security numbers, names, addresses, or embarrassing searches, and store them in large databases for decades.322
When a user deletes the cookies deposited on the hard drive, the cookies
are oftentimes respawned by flash cookies.323 This is accomplished unbeknownst to the user, without his consent, and oftentimes without being
subject to browser privacy agreements.324
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Brill, supra note 4, at 7.
Id.
Brief for Respondents, supra note 17, at 9.
Bosset, et al., supra note 14, at 4.
Id.
La Court, 2011 WL 2473399, at *8.
Id.
Id.
Serwin, supra note 51, at 815.

10/02/2013 12:46:52

325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.

33953-sft_29-4 Sheet No. 82 Side A

However, the FTC has claimed that there are benefits of targeted
advertising to both consumers and businesses, but has still sought to
protect the former while allowing the latter to engage in its business
practices.325 Because there arguably is a mutual benefit, it is likely that
targeted advertising itself will not be outright banned.326 Therefore, it is
necessary to find a solution that allows the practice to continue while
allowing consumers to be protected while they reap this benefit.327 However, the protection that consumers receive should address at least two
harms, and hopefully courts will recognize them, as well: personal dignity and autonomy, and the potential for unwanted third parties to intercept one’s private information without authorization.
Because consumers receive a benefit from targeted advertising, unjust enrichment claims for that simple fact should fail.328 However, other
common law claims should survive, such as trespass to chattels.329 This
will require courts to eventually recognize that other harms exist besides
tangible ones.330 Trespass to chattels claims should survive when plaintiffs have actively deleted cookies on their computer because they did not
wish their history to be tracked, and were unaware that persistent flash
cookies would respawn the deleted cookies.331
This comment also seeks to endorse the FTC privacy by design approach in the hopes that courts will one day recognize other harms and
thereafter reassess common law claims with these new harms in
mind.332 However, if this does not happen first, the less embraced alternative proposal is that Congress could amend the CFAA or ECPA statutes. Relief should be given to plaintiffs that had flash cookies respawn
their browser cookies because at that point there would be no authorization for a website to intercept this information.333 The lastly proposed
solution is not embraced at all because it relies on legislation and regulation that cannot keep up with technology, even if it tries to.334 A real
issue plaintiffs have at this point, as well, is that their harms need to be
clearly defined. Academic works and the FTC have begun to address
these potential harms, yet courts are still unwilling to see a true harm
when no showing of economic damage can be shown.
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Ultimately, this is a complex subject and there may not be one best
proposal, especially in an area of the law that is constantly changing and
developing, leaving the law struggling to keep up with it in order to protect ordinary people that engage in technology every day.335 It could very
well be that there is a statutory cause of action for plaintiffs if legislators
feel it is appropriate. Perhaps the FTC, by adopting policies that acknowledge other types of injuries, will encourage courts to take a different approach to the common law claims plaintiffs are making. The point
here is that while the latter is this article’s preferred proposal, plaintiffs
will continue to be denied relief until one of those two things happen.
Either way, people just feel wronged by behavioral advertising practices, and whether these feelings are unfounded may be irrelevant.336
Perhaps this is the first step in changing the minds of courts while being
able to continually adapt it to the needs of consumers who use the Internet and allow their personal information to be a part of it. As of now,
there simply is not a remedy it seems for plaintiffs, and that could make
a case that there simply is no harm to redress.337 But as long as people
are feeling that they are harmed, it is always worth investigating the
source of their injury and attempting to rectify it.
335. Interview by John Villfranco, supra note 29.
336. Vine, supra note 82.
337. Bose, 2011 WL 4343517, at *3.
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